International Law in Domestic Courts by Sloss, David & Van Alstine, Michael
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
9-2015
International Law in Domestic Courts
David Sloss
Santa Clara University School of Law, dlsloss@scu.edu
Michael Van Alstine
University of Maryland - College Park
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
David Sloss and Michael Van Alstine, International Law in Domestic Courts (2015),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/889
CHAPTER 6: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 
 
I. CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW 
 
The central premise of this volume is that the relationship of law and politics in 
international law varies depending on the sites where the relationship unfolds. In this chapter, we 
analyze that premise in the creation, interpretation, recognition, implementation, and 
modification of international norms in domestic courts. We will explain, however, that beyond 
these “stages of governance,” a decisive factor in explaining the engagement of domestic courts 
with international law is the nature of the legal rule at issue. Specifically, our analysis 
demonstrates that the willingness of domestic courts to view an international issue as one of law, 
not politics, varies in important ways depending on whether they are being asked to apply a 
horizontal (state-to-state) rule, a vertical (state-to-private party) rule, or a transnational (private-
to-private) rule.  
THE “JUDICIALIZATION” OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In their origin, composition, and institutional competence, domestic courts are legal 
institutions. Their stock in trade is the identification and application of norms of a legal, not 
political, nature. It is nonetheless now widely accepted that courts are political actors as well. 
Political scientists have explained convincingly that courts (especially supreme courts) do not 
long adhere to policies “substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.”1 Domestic 
courts are constituted by, and more generally a product of, their home polity. As a result, it is 
quite unlikely that they ever could be fully insulated from the cultural, social, and political 
environments in which they function. The relative influence of law and politics in the work of 
domestic judicial bodies thus is of intense scholarly interest. 
                                                          
1 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, (1957) 6 J. PUB. L. 291. 
All of this plays out in international law as well. Indeed, in recent years scholars have 
demonstrated convincingly the increasing significance of domestic courts in this realm, not only 
as legal actors but also as agents in the development of international norms.2 Enthusiasts have 
championed the “globalization of judicial power.”3 Some, such as Anne-Marie Slaughter, have 
highlighted the purely political aspects of “judicial globalization.”4 The focus for these scholars 
is on the means by which judges participate in cross-border dialogue as autonomous political 
actors.5 
Scholars have emphasized as well the growing influence of domestic courts in their 
formal institutional function—that is, in the enforcement of international legal norms in disputes 
properly before them. As a preliminary matter, however, one must distinguish in this regard 
between countries that have an independent judiciary and those that do not. Roughly one-third of 
the countries in the world lack an independent judiciary.6 In those countries, politics (i.e., the 
subjective, situational desires of those in power) may trump law as a routine matter. In order to 
                                                          
2 See André Nollkaemper, NATIONAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW (2011). 
3 See THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (Neal Tate & Torbjom Vallinder eds., 1995). 
4 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, (2000) 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1112-1123.  
5 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 37 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 
1996). See also Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Judicial Dialogue as a Means of Interpretation, in 
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS (H.P. Aust & G. Nolte eds., 
forthcoming 2015). Osnat Grady Schwartz, Changing the Rules of the (International) Game: How 
International Law is Turning National Courts into International Political Actors, (2105) 24 WASH. INT’L 
L.J. 99, 101, 129-134. 
6 The Polity IV Project is the best source of data for estimating the number of countries with 
independent judiciaries. See Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–
2014, available at www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html. The “exconst” variable ranks countries on a 
scale from 1 to 7, measuring the degree of external constraints on the executive branch. A score of “1” 
means that there are no significant constraints on executive power; a score of “7” indicates substantial 
constraints. In the 2014 data, 109 out of 167 rated countries received a score of “5” or better on the 
“exconst” variable. This is a reasonably good proxy for determining whether a country has an 
independent judiciary. 
analyze the relationship between law and politics in domestic courts in any productive sense, 
therefore, this chapter focuses on countries with an independent judiciary. 
In countries with an independent judiciary, the clear trend in recent decades has been the 
“judicialization”7 or “legalization”8 of international relations. This phenomenon has expanded 
the field in which claimants may resort to legal argumentation, not political contestation, in 
international disputes. Moreover, recent decades have witnessed an extraordinary increase in the 
“density” of international law. It now covers large swaths of the legal landscape, from 
commercial law to environmental law, family law, and human rights law (among myriad others). 
The ultimate effect of such “judicialization” is to “shift … the balance of power between law and 
politics [to] favor judicial institutions over representative and accountable institutions.”9 
The primary question domestic courts must confront, however, is whether any particular 
norm has passed from the realm of politics to law. As Kenneth Abbott et al. have explained,10 
“legalization” of an international norm involves three essential attributes, each of which is “a 
matter of degree and gradation”: (1) “obligation”—the extent to which the norm is legally 
binding on a state or other actor; (2) “precision”—the extent to which the norm unambiguously 
defines the required, authorized, or proscribed conduct11; and (3) “delegation”—the extent to 
                                                          
7 See; Ran Hirschl, The New Constitution and the Judicialization of Politics Worldwide, 75 
Fordham L. Rev. 721, 723-724 (2006); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS 
AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002); Schwartz, supra note 5, 129-134. 
8 See generally LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith L. Goldstein et al., eds., 2001). 
9 Russell A. Miller, Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of ‘Pure Politics’ in the United 
States and Germany, (2004) 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 587, 590. 
10 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, et al., The Concept of Legalization, (2000) 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 
401-404. 
11 Franck describes a norm with this attribute as one that is “determinate.” Thomas M. Franck, 
THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 41-49 (1990). Koskenniemi captures the notion with the 
term “concreteness.” Marrti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, (1990) 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4, 
7-19. 
which third party institutions (especially domestic courts, independent agencies, and 
international courts) have authority “to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve 
disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules.”12 
In broad terms, one may describe the differing attitudes of domestic courts toward 
international law based on their tendency to adopt either “harmonization techniques” or 
“avoidance techniques.”13 The former term covers a wide variety of practices domestic courts 
employ to give effect to international norms in their domestic legal systems. The latter term 
describes a range of contrasting techniques some domestic courts have devised “to by‐pass 
otherwise (i.e. under their own constitutional arrangements) applicable international legal 
provisions.”14 
The most potent “harmonization technique” is a decision by a domestic court that a 
particular international norm is binding as formal law in the domestic legal system. But some 
courts also have given effect to international norms that do not formally qualify as domestic law. 
In this vein, courts have given effect to unincorporated treaties, applied interpretive presumptions 
to ensure conformity of domestic statutes with international law, and even relied on international 
norms in constitutional interpretation. Courts inclined to special “friendliness”15 to international 
                                                          
12 Sandholtz and Sweet describe this phenomenon as a continuum founded on the extent to which 
rules are “formal precise, and authoritative” and are “tied to organizational supports, including 
enforcement mechanisms.” Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and International 
Governance 239-242, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Christian Reus-Smit, ed., 2004).  
13 See Preliminary Report: Principles on Engagement of Domestic Courts with International Law 
6-9 (ILA Study Group, 2013)(employing these terms to describe the variations in the application of 
international law by domestic courts). 
14 Id., at 7. 
15 The term “friendliness to international law” often is attributed to Antonio Cassese, Modern 
Constitutions and International Law, III Academie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours (1985) 331, 
343. 
law also have found fertile ground for the development of domestic law in existing (and even 
developing) rules of customary international law.  
When, in contrast, courts resort to “avoidance techniques” they relegate claims founded 
in international law to politics or diplomacy.16 For example, some courts have recognized a 
“political question” doctrine for issues with particularly important or sensitive foreign policy 
implications.17 A narrow conception of “standing” or “justiciability” may severely circumscribe 
the pool of permitted claimants. Some courts also have afforded deference to the executive 
branch in interpreting international legal norms. Additionally, courts in some countries apply the 
doctrine of “non-self-executing” treaties as an avoidance technique. These and related avoidance 
techniques carry particular significance for the theme of this volume, for they enable domestic 
courts to weigh political considerations in the application of international norms to specific 
disputes.  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUBJECT MATTER: HORIZONTAL, VERTICAL, AND TRANSNATIONAL 
RULES 
The introductory chapter to this volume suggests that the relationship between politics 
and international law varies across stages of governance and governance systems. It also notes 
that “different systems of governance are demarcated by their subject matter, their scope, or 
both.”18 Our analysis reveals that the relative influence of law and politics in the attitudes of 
domestic courts toward international law varies considerably across subject matter. That is, the 
willingness of national courts to view an international issue as one of law—and thus within their 
                                                          
16 See Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International 
Law by National Courts, (2008) 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 242. 
17 The leading United States Supreme Court case on the subject rejected the notion that all cases 
that involve foreign affairs implicate the political question doctrine. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 
(1962). 
18 See Chapter One, p. __. 
realm of authority notwithstanding the political implications—depends heavily on the subject 
matter of the legal rule involved. Specifically, judicial behavior varies depending on whether an 
international legal rule regulates the “horizontal” relations between states, the cross-border 
“transnational” relations between private actors, or the “vertical” relations between states and 
private actors. 
Horizontal Rules. Part II analyzes the role of domestic courts in applying legal rules that 
govern relations between and among sovereign states. This is the traditional realm of interstate 
diplomacy dominated by political considerations and national interest. 
International law rules governing horizontal relations may be both highly obligatory and 
highly precise. An arms control treaty with detailed limits on armaments represents a good 
example. But even when international law has these attributes, Part II describes a strong 
presumption that the sovereign states involved have not delegated enforcement authority to 
national courts. The main exception involves rules protecting the jurisdictional immunity of 
states in domestic courts.  
Transnational Rules. Part III then examines the sharply divergent judicial attitude toward 
“transnational” legal rules: international norms that regulate cross-border legal relations between 
private actors. As one of us observed, disputes on this plane “rarely have sufficient political 
salience to become the subject of interstate diplomacy.”19 The benefits of uniform law for cross-
border private transactions nonetheless have led states to adopt wide-ranging international norms 
governing transnational relationships, including multilateral treaties in commercial law, civil 
procedure, arbitration, family law, and aviation law, among others.  
                                                          
19 David Sloss, Domestic Application of Treaties 377, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES (D. 
Hollis, ed., OUP 2012). 
In this realm, a legal perspective predominates, and as Part III explains, judicial 
avoidance doctrines play little role. Instead, for transnational rules the norm in domestic courts is 
harmonization. And in sharp contrast to horizontal rules, domestic courts recognize, interpret, 
and apply international law here almost irrespective of the political implications. This is true 
even if the relevant norms are obscure, equitable, or highly imprecise. Norms of “good faith” and 
“reasonableness” in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
represent a good example. 
Vertical Rules. Part IV takes up the third category of international legal rules—those 
governing the “vertical” relations between states and private parties. This category includes both 
treaty law and customary international law related to refugees, human rights, and international 
humanitarian law (IHL). When called upon to apply vertical rules, domestic courts oscillate 
between harmonization and avoidance techniques, depending partly upon whether they perceive 
the contested issue as legal or political. 
Rules governing vertical relations between States and private actors often present 
challenging issues for domestic courts. Disputes in this realm equally may touch on sovereign 
functions traditionally allocated to political discretion and implicate the traditional judicial 
function of protecting private rights from governmental intrusion. Vertical rules require, 
therefore, a particularly careful analysis of the form and nature of state consent, of comparative 
constitutional structures, of the relative institutional competence of the judicial branch, and of the 
special need for judicial independence. Questions of legal obligation and precision will play an 
important role. But a key point of divergence is the domestic courts’ own assessment of whether 
it is appropriate for them to apply international legal rules to protect individual rights against 
infringement by government actors. 
Ultimately, as Part IV explains, the relative influence of law and politics in this realm 
depends on the extent to which particular domestic courts adopt avoidance techniques (as in 
horizontal disputes) or harmonization techniques (as in transnational disputes). But it is also on 
this issue, perhaps more than any other we examine in this chapter, that a comparative law 
perspective exposes striking differences among national court systems. 
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES 
Throughout this chapter we analyze the relative influence of law and politics in 
international law from a comparative perspective. Recent years have witnessed an increasing 
interest of scholars in the application of international law in domestic legal systems. Detailed 
analyses now exist for a number of states, especially on treaty law.20 We have participated in 
some of those projects.21 We provide a brief review of the principal system types here to set a 
context for the more detailed analysis that follows. 
Nearly every constitutional system contains rules for the making and ratification of 
treaties. Some—especially more modern ones—contain express provisions on the subject.22 
Nearly fifty include references to the domestic legal force of specific treaties, especially on 
human rights.23 Other constitutional structures, especially those that follow the British 
                                                          
20 See THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT (David Sloss, ed., Cambridge 
2009)(“Treaty Enforcement”); NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (Duncan B. Hollis, Merritt R. 
Blakeslee and L. Benjamin Ederington, eds., Martinus Nijhoff, 2005). See also The Oxford Guide to 
Treaties, supra note 19; Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (2nd ed. CUP 2007). 
21 See Sloss, supra note 19; David Sloss, Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative 
Analysis, 1-60, in Treaty Enforcement, supra note 20; Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of Domestic 
Courts in Treaty Enforcement: Summary and Conclusions 555-613, in Treaty Enforcement, supra note 
20. 
22 Sloss, supra note 19, 373-376; Van Alstine, supra note 20, 566-569. 
23 See Wayne Sandholtz, How Domestic Courts Use International Law, (2015) 38 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 595, 605. 
parliamentary system, have established conventions on the subject.24 Some constitutions, though 
substantially fewer, also include express references to customary international law.25 
It is common in this context to draw a distinction between so-called “dualist” and 
“monist” approaches to international law. Theoretical debates aside, we use those terms to 
describe two broad types of domestic legal systems. The fundamental issue that divides the two 
is whether international norms have the status of law in the domestic legal system. 
Treaty law provides the clearest illustration of the distinction. As one of us has observed, 
“[t]he key distinguishing feature of dualism is that no treaties have the formal status of law in the 
domestic legal system unless the legislature enacts a statute to incorporate the treaty into 
domestic law.”26 Thus, even if the executive department has expressed consent as a matter of 
international law, in dualist systems the legislature must “incorporate” the treaty by standard 
legislation in order for it to have the force of domestic law. Otherwise, the treaty remains 
“unincorporated” (although, as noted below, some courts have recognized an influence for such 
treaties as well). This is the approach of almost all British Commonwealth States, as well as a 
few others.27  
It is harder to generalize about states that follow a monist approach. Nonetheless, the key 
feature of this type of state is that at least some treaties function as directly applicable domestic 
law without implementing legislation. Beyond this generalization, the monist states differ among 
themselves in several respects. Because of the different approaches to legislative consent and 
                                                          
24 Sloss, supra note 19, 370-371; Van Alstine, supra note 20, 569-576. 
25 See Van Alstine, supra note 20, 581. 
26 Sloss, supra note 19, 370. 
27 Id. 
implementation, in this chapter we shall refer to these states as “hybrid monist.”28) Some hybrid 
monist states require advance legislative approval for all treaties before the executive may 
express consent under international law; others require such approval only for certain treaty 
types. Considerable differences also exist on which treaties require subsequent legislative 
implementation. It is here that debates over self-executing and non-self-executing treaties are 
most significant. Hybrid monist states diverge as well on the hierarchical status of treaties, with 
some even elevating them (in certain contexts) over the domestic constitution.29 
Despite the formal distinctions, our analysis reveals few functional differences between 
dualist and hybrid monist states in the application of international norms. Indeed, as described in 
Parts II to IV, our conclusions about the important role of subject matter hold across the diversity 
of state systems. Thus, courts in dualist and hybrid monist states alike commonly defer to the 
political branches on horizontal rules (see Part II). With transnational rules, in contrast, courts 
from all system types routinely apply appropriately sanctioned international norms to resolve 
legal disputes that come before them (see Part III). 
With vertical rules, a state’s formal classification as dualist or hybrid monist does not 
seem to be a decisive factor in explaining the behavior of courts.30 Nonetheless, as Part IV 
analyzes in detail, domestic courts diverge substantially in their willingness to defer to political 
interests in disputes between governments and private parties. And on no subject is this more 
glaring than in the protection of international human rights. 
DOMESTIC COURTS AND THE STAGES OF GOVERNANCE 
                                                          
28 See Van Alstine, supra note 20, at 569-570 (employing this term). 
29 See generally Sloss, supra note 19, 373-376; Van Alstine, supra note 20, 569-581. 
30 Sloss, supra note 19, 378-379. 
This volume analyzes the relationship between law and politics based on five “stages of 
governance.” On two of these stages, domestic courts are frequent and substantial players. 
Interpretation of legal norms is an essential function of an independent judiciary. Domestic 
courts also play an important role in the implementation of international law by issuing 
authoritative judgments in litigated disputes. These two subjects occupy much of our attention in 
this chapter. 
For the remaining three stages of governance, in contrast, the influence of domestic 
courts is more limited. From their constitutional station and institutional competence, domestic 
courts have only a circumscribed role in international law rule-making. In a formal sense, states 
make treaties, and courts are not empowered to adjust the substance to advance broader interests. 
In some systems the common law opens a channel for the recognition of norms of customary 
international law. As a more general matter, a “transjudicial dialogue” may foster epistemic 
communities for the recognition of such norms. But here as well, a faithful adherence to the 
judicial function places constraints on judges making, as opposed to finding, the law. A rare 
exception may be on the subject of conduct-based immunity of former government officials for 
acts of torture committed while in office.31 
A distinct stage of governance involves decision-making by the subjects of legal rules. 
Courts are not generally the subjects of international legal norms—beyond the general obligation 
of a state institution to apply the law created by the political branches. However, some 
international rules target proceedings in domestic courts themselves. Thus, for example, 
domestic courts ultimately are the subjects for the rules of customary international law on state 
                                                          
31 Compare Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763 (4th Cir. 2012)(rejecting a claim of immunity) with 
Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (2006) UKHL 26, 14 June 2006 
(recognizing immunity). 
immunity, for the very question is whether the court will exercise jurisdiction over a foreign 
state. Transnational treaties on civil procedure matters and the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards fall in the same general category. 
Though limited, the actions of domestic courts are also significant in legal change. Of 
their nature, independent courts are sources of “rule innovation,”32 a phenomenon equally 
applicable to international law. Indeed, transnational judicial dialogue may be most pronounced 
in the development of customary international law. Although formally only a “subsidiary means” 
for determining the law, decisions of domestic courts contribute to the content of the law through 
an iterative process of recognition and adjustment over time. Moreover, on some subjects (e.g., 
immunity, court procedure, the act of state doctrine) the actions of domestic courts, as state 
organs, constitute “state practice” that drives the development and modification of customary 
international law. 
Disputes in domestic courts over the meaning and effect of treaties likewise provide a 
platform for legal change. Fundamental principles of treaty interpretation—good faith, 
autonomous interpretation, respect for foreign court judgments—support the development of 
epistemic communities among domestic courts that may lead to progressive changes in agreed 
meaning over time. Some treaties even expressly or impliedly delegate authority to courts to 
engage in “dynamic” interpretation to address future developments. In all of this, domestic 
courts, intentionally or not, may contribute to evolution in the content of international legal 
norms over time. 
II. HORIZONTAL RULES 
                                                          
32 Sandholtz & Sweet, supra note 12, 247-248. 
Horizontal rules regulate relationships between sovereign states. When domestic courts 
confront horizontal disputes, they often view the cases as “political,” not “legal,” and they apply 
various avoidance techniques to avoid decisions on the merits. The governing model of 
enforcement is diplomacy, political contestation, and non-judicial sanctions in the parties’ 
interstate relations. Domestic courts commonly employ avoidance doctrines “to align their 
findings and judgments with the preferences of their governments and thus to guarantee [the 
governments] complete latitude in external affairs.”33 In this realm, domestic courts do not play 
an active role at any of the five “stages of governance,” subject to the exception of state 
immunity, discussed below. 
An Italian decision in Presidency of the Council of Ministers v. Markovic is illustrative.34 
In April 1999, NATO forces bombed a radio station in Yugoslavia, killing Dejan Markovic and 
Slobodan Jontic. Surviving family members filed suit in Italy against the Ministry of Defence 
and others. Plaintiffs alleged violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) rules prohibiting 
the use of weapons “directed against a non-military objective and intentionally intended to harm 
civilians.”35 Defendants argued that Italian courts lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of 
Cassation ruled for defendants on jurisdictional grounds, holding “that neither the ordinary 
courts nor any other court can consider the dispute.”36 The court said: “The choice of a means of 
conducting hostilities is an act of Government. These are acts that constitute the manifestation of 
a political function . . . . The provisions of the [Geneva Conventions] . . . which govern the 
                                                          
33 Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 242. 
34 85 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 799 (2002), ILDC 293 (IT 2002) [“Markovic”]. 
Throughout this chapter, the abbreviation “ILDC” refers to the Oxford database on International Law in 
Domestic Courts. The designation “ILDC 293” is an identifier assigned by the editors of that database. 
Quotations from the case are taken from the English translation available in the Oxford database. 
35 Markovic, The Facts, para. 1. 
36 Id., The Law, para. 5. 
conduct of hostilities are . . . provisions of international law [that] govern relations between 
States.”37  
In sum, the court described the relevant legal rules as horizontal rules that “govern 
relations between states” and it characterized the underlying conduct as “the manifestation of a 
political function.” These two ideas — that the rule is horizontal and that the function is political 
— are closely related. The plaintiffs thought they were asking the court to apply a vertical rule of 
law that protects individual civilians from unlawful use of weapons by state actors. From their 
perspective, their claim was similar to a claim that government officers violated the European 
Convention on Human Rights: a type of claim that Italian courts often adjudicate.38 However, 
from the court’s perspective, the fact that the use of force occurred in the context of an 
international armed conflict meant that the case was properly viewed as a horizontal dispute 
between states, not a vertical dispute between state actors and private parties. Thus, Markovic 
illustrates two important points. First, domestic courts often have discretion in choosing whether 
to frame a dispute in horizontal or vertical terms. Second, the choice to frame it as a horizontal 
dispute typically means that the court views the contested issues as political, not legal, and 
domestic courts generally avoid the merits of political questions.39  
However, domestic courts often enforce horizontal rules on state immunity. Customary 
international law provides that states may not permit their domestic courts to exercise 
                                                          
37 Id., The Law, paras. 2-3.  
38 See Dorigo and President of the Council of Ministers (intervening), No. 113/2011 (Corte 
Costituzionale, Italy) (holding that Italian courts must re-open criminal proceedings in cases where the 
European Court of Human Rights finds a violation of fair trial rights).  
39 See also Varvarin Bridge Case, BGHZ 166, 384 (Federal Supreme Court of Germany), ILDC 
887 (DE 2006) (dismissing claim against Germany by victims of NATO bombing in Serbia). 
jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, unless one of several exceptions applies.40 The rules 
governing state immunity are properly viewed as horizontal rules because they protect one state 
from the exercise of sovereign (judicial) power by another state. Even so, immunity issues 
frequently arise in vertical disputes between states and private parties.  
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ghana is illustrative. In May 2006, a federal 
court in New York issued a judgment in favor of a bond holder, NML Capital, against the 
Republic of Argentina, the issuer of sovereign bonds.41 Argentina had waived its immunity from 
jurisdiction. However, NML could not execute the judgment because Argentina did not waive its 
immunity from attachment. In an attempt to collect the money it was owed, NML undertook a 
global search for Argentine assets subject to attachment.42 When an Argentine warship docked at 
a port in Ghana, NML tried to attach the warship to collect on the prior judgment. A lower court 
granted an attachment order and seized the vessel.43 At this point, the dispute was effectively 
transformed from a vertical dispute between NML and Argentina to a horizontal dispute between 
Ghana and Argentina, as evidenced by the fact that Argentina sued Ghana in the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). ITLOS held that the attachment order breached an 
international obligation that Ghana owed to Argentina: the obligation to refrain from exercising 
                                                          
40 See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 
2012 I.C.J. 143. 
41 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2006 WL 1294853 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
42 See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct. 2250, 2253 (noting that “NML has 
pursued discovery of Argentina’s property” since 2003). 
43 See The Republic v. High Court (Comm. Div.) Accra, Supreme Court of Ghana (20 June 2013). 
jurisdiction over Argentina in Ghana’s domestic courts.44 The Supreme Court of Ghana 
remedied the breach by reversing the attachment order.45 
Chapter One identifies “decision-making” as a stage of governance in which “the actors 
whose behavior is governed by a rule” make decisions on the basis of that rule.46 State immunity 
rules are unusual because domestic courts are key actors governed by those rules—in a practical 
sense, if not a formal sense. The Supreme Court of Ghana effectively implemented the 
international immunity rule by reversing the attachment order.47 The Ghanaian Court’s decision 
is similar to the Italian court’s decision in Markovic, in that both courts relied on jurisdictional 
rules to avoid the merits of the underlying dispute. However, the Ghanaian Court applied the 
international immunity rule to justify its jurisdictional decision, whereas the Italian court applied 
a domestic jurisdictional rule to avoid application of the international (IHL) rule.  
III. TRANSNATIONAL RULES 
The governance system for transnational legal rules in domestic courts is strikingly 
different from that for horizontal rules. For rules governing disputes between private parties, 
domestic courts play an active role almost irrespective of the salience of political interests. In this 
respect, the governance system for transnational rules in domestic courts differs even from 
“vertical” legal rules with significant effects on private interests. 
                                                          
44 See Argentina v. Ghana (The ARA Libertad Case), International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Sea, No. 20. 
45 Republic v. High Court, supra note 45. 
46 See Chapter one, p. __. 
47 The government of Ghana released the ship before the Supreme Court of Ghana issued its 
ruling, but the Supreme Court decision validated the legality of the government’s action. 
As noted in Part One, the predominant model of governance for transnational legal rules 
is “judicialization.”48 In this realm, domestic courts commonly assume—often without detailed 
analysis—that they have enforcement authority even if the relevant norms may touch on political 
sensitivities, are highly imprecise, or involve substantial discretion. The result is that courts 
routinely apply, interpret, and develop transnational norms in the disputes before them. 
The Significance of Multilateral Treaties. 
Historically, customary norms predominated in transnational private relations in areas 
such as commercial and maritime law. As A. Claire Cutler has exhaustively demonstrated, 
however, since the nineteenth century domestic statutory and common law have displaced the 
private customary law of the lex mercatoria.49  
The active engagement of domestic courts with transnational norms becomes clearest 
through their role in applying multilateral treaties. Treaties governing transnational private 
relations are numerous and practically significant. To choose just a few prominent examples, 
widely accepted conventions cover enforcement of international arbitral awards (the 1958 New 
York Convention, with over 150 member states); international carriage by air (the 1999 Montreal 
Convention, with over 110 member states); the civil aspects of international child abduction (the 
1980 Hague Convention, with nearly 100 member states); and contracts for the international sale 
of goods (the 1980 Vienna Convention (CISG), with over 80 member states). Numerous other 
treaties cover other aspects of commercial and family law, as well as civil procedure and other 
private law subjects. 
                                                          
48 See A. Claire Cutler, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY 2 (CUP 2003)(citing a trend 
toward “the juridification of political, social, and economic life”). 
49 See id. at 141-179. 
The practical significance of these transnational treaties finds expression in the fact that 
the distinction between dualist and hybrid monist states becomes almost entirely irrelevant in this 
realm. “Scheduling” is a common means for the incorporation of such treaties in dualist states. 
Under this practice, the legislature gives a treaty the force of domestic law by appending its text 
to an implementing statute.50 Thus, for example, the U.K.’s Child Abduction and Custody Act of 
1985 declares that “the provisions of that [Hague] Convention set out in Schedule 1 to this Act 
shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom.”51 The result is that the treaty itself falls 
within the enforcement authority of domestic courts. 
The result is similar in hybrid monist states. For such states, some treaties function as 
directly applicable domestic law. But in contrast to vertical treaties, transnational treaties have 
not triggered debates over “self-execution” (or “direct effect”).52 Rather, either the political 
departments declare in advance that the treaties have direct effect, or domestic courts simply 
assume, with little analysis, that this is the case. Even in the sometimes-skeptical United States, 
the issue of self-execution of transnational treaties barely has caused a ripple in judicial 
analysis.53 
                                                          
50 See Van Alstine, supra note 20, at 568-569 (summarizing the practice for Australia, Canada, 
Israel, and the United Kingdom). 
51 Child Abduction and Custody Act of 1985, § 1. See also, e.g., Kenya’s International Interests in 
Aircraft Equipment Act (2013), § 4 (providing that the Cape Town Convention and its protocol on aircraft 
equipment “shall have the force of law”); Canada’s International Sale of Goods Contracts Convention Act 
(1991), § 4 (declaring that the UN Sales Convention has “the force of law in Canada”). 
52 See Van Alstine, supra note 20, at 599-603. 
53 See, e.g., Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 359-60 (2nd Cir. 2013)(declaring that the Hague 
Child Abduction Convention is self-executing); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. 
Supp. 2d 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)(same for the CISG); Baah v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., 473 
F.Supp.2d 591, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)(same for the Montreal Air Carriage Convention). See also generally 
David Sloss, United States 504 et seq., in Treaty Enforcement, supra note 20 (comprehensively analyzing 
the application of treaties by U.S. courts). 
Domestic courts rely on such treaties not merely as “persuasive authority”—which 
“attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it”54—but rather as binding and directly enforceable 
domestic law. And with the force of law, transnational treaties fall within the enforcement 
authority of domestic courts, like norms of a purely domestic origin.55 Thus, in both dualist and 
hybrid monist states transnational treaties are perhaps the “hardest” of international legal norms 
in the routine work of domestic courts. 
Although often overlooked by public law scholars, treaties governing private relations are 
among the most common sources for the application of international law in domestic courts. 
Such treaties have generated thousands of reported opinions (and likely many more unreported 
ones). Judicial decisions applying the CISG alone number over ten thousand.56 At least 1750 
domestic court decisions apply the New York Convention.57 The International Child Abduction 
Database of the Hague Conference lists nearly one thousand domestic court opinions.58 The 
Montreal Convention and its predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, have generated over 660 
decisions in total in just six jurisdictions.59 These formally reported opinions likely only scratch 
the surface in the routine resolution of disputes by domestic courts in commercial law, civil 
procedure, family law, aviation law, and the many other fields now governed by transnational 
treaties. 
                                                          
54 Sandholtz, supra note 23, at 611-612 (quoting H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, (1987) 
32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263). 
55 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing that federal district courts in the United States “shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under … treaties of the United States”). 
56 See CISG Database, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/digest-cases-toc.html. 
57 See http://newyorkconvention.org.  
58 See http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?act=text.text&lng=1. 
59 A search of the WestLaw database revealed 653 cases that have cited the Warsaw or Montreal 
Conventions in just Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
The Preeminence of Law over Politics  
The primary theme of this volume is that the relative influence of law and politics varies 
according to the sites in which their relationship unfolds. At the site of domestic court 
application of transnational legal norms, law predominates over politics in nearly every respect. 
The realm of transnational private relations is highly “legalized.” Thus, the permissible 
grounds for argumentation by disputants (the “argumentation frameworks”)60 are legal (not 
political) in source, form, and content. Litigants and judges alike revert to “the text, purpose, and 
history of the rules, their interpretation, admissible exceptions, applicability to classes of 
situations, and particular facts.”61 Likewise, the dominant model of judicial decision-making is 
“legal.”62 Judges cite transnational treaties “because they contain relevant law and interpretive 
guidelines” that are binding in the domestic legal system. Theories of “attitudinal” judging (i.e., 
based on political or ideological preferences) or “strategic” judging (i.e., to satisfy the interests 
of other institutional actors such as the executive, the legislature, or public opinion) are of 
minimal relevance.63 
The contrast with horizontal, and even many vertical, rules in this respect is striking. The 
attitude of the United States Supreme Court provides a clear example. That court hardly is 
“friendly” to international law, as its decisions on Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (a vertical provision) amply demonstrate.64 But the Court has embraced 
                                                          
60 Sandholtz & Sweet, supra note 12, at 245-247. 
61 Id. 
62 See Sandholtz, supra note 23, at 611. 
63 Id., at 611 (reviewing models of judicial decision-making). 
64 See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 
(1998)(per curiam). 
transnational legal norms with enthusiasm. Thus, for example, the Court issued this declaration 
in a custody dispute governed by the Hague Child Abduction Convention: 
Custody decisions are often difficult. Judges must strive always to avoid a 
common tendency to prefer their own society and culture[.] International law 
serves a high purpose when it underwrites the determination by nations to rely 
upon their domestic courts to enforce just laws by legitimate and fair 
proceedings.65 
The touchstone nonetheless remains legal, as the Court emphasized in a recent opinion 
applying the same treaty. In a marked departure from its reliance on procedural default rules in 
disputes over the Vienna Consular Convention, the Court declared that it was “unwilling to apply 
equitable tolling principles that would, in practice, rewrite the treaty.”66 
Domestic courts throughout the world routinely assume that they have enforcement 
authority even for transnational norms that only dimly satisfy the other recognized attributes of 
“legalization” (obligation and precision).67 Many provisions in transnational treaties are highly 
indefinite or involve substantial discretion. For example, the Hague Child Abduction Convention 
recognizes an exception if a return order would place a child in an “intolerable situation.”68 As a 
more general matter, as the U.K. House of Lords has observed, “[i]nternational jurisprudence 
supports a broad interpretation of the factors that may be relevant in the discretionary exercise” 
of returning under that treaty.69 The CISG also repeatedly defines rights or obligations by what is 
“reasonable” or “unreasonable” under the circumstances.70 And the New York Convention 
                                                          
65 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010). 
66 Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1235 (2014). 
67 See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra. 
68 See art. 13. 
69 See In re M and Another [2007] UKHL 55. 
70 See arts. 34, 35(2)(b), 37, 48(1), 60(a), 75, 77, 79(1), 79(4), 85, 86(1), 86(2), 87, 88(2), 88(3). 
grants exceptions based on an absence of “proper notice” or “public policy.”71 Numerous similar 
examples exist in other transnational treaties. Notwithstanding such highly imprecise norms, 
domestic courts routinely adopt the “legal” model of judicial decision-making. They interpret 
and apply the treaties as binding legal norms—even if doing so requires the exercise of 
substantial judicial discretion. 
Domestic courts also do so in situations of high political salience. Granted, transnational 
legal rarely touch on political nerves in an appreciable way (compared to horizontal and vertical 
rules). Disputes involving transnational rules simply are too numerous or mundane for the 
executive branch to assert its policy preferences on a regular basis. Moreover, the competing 
interests often cut across the political divide: A buyer or seller in an international sale is equally 
likely to be a member of one political party as another; so too is a father or mother in an 
international child custody dispute. As a result, the political branches commonly are content to 
leave the resolution of the related legal issues to the courts.72 
Even transnational disputes, however, sometimes trigger significant international political 
conflicts. For example, controversies over the alleged failure of some foreign courts to adhere to 
the Hague Child Abduction Convention recently spawned a special statute in the United States 
authorizing targeted sanctions by the executive branch.73 Similarly, the United States Supreme 
Court recently highlighted “the diplomatic consequences resulting from this Court’s 
interpretation of ‘rights of custody’ ” under the Convention, “including the likely reaction of 
other contracting states and the impact on the State Department’s ability to reclaim children 
                                                          
71 See arts. V(1)(b), V(2)(b). 
72 See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary 
(1993) 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (demonstrating that party moderates across the political divide 
sometimes invite the judiciary to resolve certain sensitive issues). 
73 See The Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 
2014. PL 113-150, August 8, 2014, 128 Stat 1807, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 9101 et seq. 
abducted from [the United States].”74 Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to interpret and apply 
the Convention. Likewise, one finds little weighing of political sensitivities in the application of 
transnational legal norms by domestic courts around the world. 
This is true even for domestic courts in states that do not have an exemplary reputation 
for judicial independence. Thus, courts in China have issued scores of opinions on the CISG,75 
applied aviation treaties (beginning with a landmark opinion by a District Court in Shanghai76), 
and enforced arbitral awards under the New York Convention.77  
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, judicial avoidance doctrines have 
played a quite limited role in the realm of transnational legal relations. One finds here almost no 
mention of political question, non-justiciability, or similar doctrines. Likewise, the debate over 
whether particular treaty provisions are “self-executing” or have “direct effect” simply has not 
featured prominently in transnational disputes. Most domestic courts do not grant deference to 
the executive branch in treaty interpretation.78 Although United States courts use the rhetoric of 
deference in transnational disputes,79 little evidence exists that the executive branch has 
exercised political influence over judicial decisions.80  
                                                          
74 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010). 
75 See http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html#china. 
76 See Hong v United Airlines Incorporated, (Dist. Ct. of Shanghai, First instance, Nov. 26, 2001) 
4 Gazette of Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China 141, [2000] Min Jing Chu No 
1639, ILDC 780 (CN 2001)(applying the Warsaw Convention on international air carriage ). 
77 See http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court-decisions/decisions-per-country#chinapr. See 
also Xue Hanqin & Jin Qian, International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic Legal System, 8 CHINESE J. 
INT’L L. 299 (2009) 
78 See Van Alstine, supra note 20, at 592-593. 
79 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010); El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 
155, 168 (1999). 
80 The U.S. executive branch often expresses its opinion on the interpretation of transnational 
treaties in the form of amicus curiae briefs, and it is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to agree with 
those expressed opinions. See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010)(noting that the Court’s 
Domestic Court Engagement and the Stages of Governance. 
As noted in Part One, domestic courts generally do not play an active role in rule-making 
or decision-making regarding international legal norms. But for transnational legal rules, 
domestic courts have noteworthy influence in interpretation, implementation, and progressive 
development over time. 
The role of domestic courts in the interpretation of transnational legal norms is expansive 
and significant. The influence of domestic courts has become most pronounced through the 
process of developing an international consensus on the meaning of treaty provisions. 
Determining the meaning of treaties leaves considerable discretion for domestic courts in their 
primary duty “to say what the law is.”81 For transnational legal rules, this essential judicial role 
creates a platform for a process of judicial dialogue across jurisdictions. The foundation for this 
process is the recognition, including by courts from dualist states,82 that the relevant source of 
interpretive evidence is the treaty itself, including its drafting history (travaux préparatoires) and 
the subsequent practice of states. Most courts rely on the interpretive rules of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.83 With the foundation of uniform source materials and 
principles, together with a recognized goal of uniform interpretation, the result has been 
substantial cooperation and collaboration by domestic courts around the world. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interpretation of the Hague Child Abduction Convention was “supported and informed by the State 
Department’s view on the issue”). 
81 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
82 See Povey v Qantas Airways Limited [2005] HCA 33 (2005)(High Court of 
Australia)(involving a claim by a passenger against an airline); Sidhu v British Airways Plc [1997] AC 
430, 443 (House of Lords)(same). 
83 See Van Alstine, supra note 20, at 587-591. 
Of great importance in this cooperation is the widespread reliance on the opinions of 
courts from other treaty member states.84 Courts from dualist85 and hybrid monist86 traditions 
alike have emphasized that decisions of other member state courts are “entitled to considerable 
weight” (in the words of the United States Supreme Court87). Indeed, for transnational treaties, 
“transnational judicial dialogue” is not merely theoretical or aspirational. A formal International 
Hague Network of Judges (composed of domestic judges from sixty-one jurisdictions) works to 
secure uniform interpretations of the Hague Child Abduction Convention.88 Official 
compilations of domestic court interpretations also exist to advance uniformity in the application 
of other transnational treaties. And, significantly, this substantial judicial cooperation transpires 
without the formal involvement of the political branches. 
The influence of domestic courts on decision-making (as noted in Part I) is limited, even 
for transnational legal rules. The narrow exception is for treaties that provide rules affecting 
procedure in the courts themselves. Thus, in a real sense, domestic courts are the subjects of 
transnational treaties on service of process and taking of evidence abroad,89 as well as the New 
York Convention on the enforcement of arbitral awards. Nonetheless, for these treaties as well, a 
                                                          
84 See Tzanakopoulos, supra note 5. 
85 See, e.g., Smallmon vs. Transport Sales Ltd., (2010), Civ.-2009-409-000363, para 82 (High 
Court of New Zealand)(applying the CISG); In re M and Another [2007] UKHL 55 (U.K. House of 
Lords)(applying the Hague Child Abduction Convention); Povey v Qantas Airways Limited [2005] HCA 
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Netherlands, Poland, and Germany). 
87 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010)(quoting an earlier opinion). 
88 See Judith Kreeger, The International Hague Judicial Network—A Progressing Work, (2014) 
48 FAM. L.Q. 221; Robin Moglove Diamond, The International Hague Network of Judges, available at 
http://www.iawj.org/International_Hague_Network_of_Judges-Justice_Diamond.pdf. 
89 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965; the Convention on the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970. 
legal perspective predominates, and there is little evidence that political considerations play a 
noteworthy role in decision-making by domestic courts. 
Domestic courts fulfill an essential function in the implementation of transnational legal 
norms. In disputes between private parties, domestic courts are the principal state institutions in 
this stage of governance based on their authority to issue final judgments. But again, the 
governing model here is “judicialization.” In nearly all cases, courts treat norms that regulate 
transnational private relations as legal in nature and thus subject to the courts’ traditional 
enforcement authority in disputes properly before them. Resort to avoidance doctrines as a cover 
for political sensitivities is neither common nor significant. At the site of the implementation of 
transnational rules by domestic courts, in short, law nearly always triumphs over politics. 
Regarding legal change in transnational rules, domestic courts do not have formal 
authority to modify the law created by the political branches. But transnational treaties, more 
than any other type, require active engagement by domestic courts to ensure the continued 
fulfillment of their purpose over time. Of their nature, such treaties regulate the activities of 
substantially more actors and in dynamic social and technological environments. As a result, 
over time the domestic courts charged with interpretation and application increasingly confront 
issues that the drafters did not foresee, or simply chose not to resolve. To ensure the continued 
vitality and relevance of such treaties, domestic courts must adapt their provisions to new and 
unexpected environments.90 Indeed, some commercial law treaties expressly empower domestic 
courts to fill regulatory gaps as they emerge over time, which one of us has described as a 
                                                          
90 In situations of doubt, some courts even have turned to a decidedly “soft” form of international 
norms, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. See Michael Bonell, The CISG, 
European Contract Law and the Development of a World Contract law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 22-25 
(2008)(surveying the application of the Principles by domestic courts and arbitral tribunals). 
delegated authority to engage in “dynamic treaty interpretation.”91 The result is that domestic 
courts have the power (whether formally or practically) to effect legal change in fulfillment of 
the fundamental purposes of transnational treaties. 
IV. VERTICAL RULES 
It is difficult to formulate general statements describing application of vertical 
international rules by domestic courts because national legal systems vary greatly. Even so, to 
identify some order amidst the chaos, three preliminary observations may be helpful. First, 
following the theme introduced in Part I, this Part focuses on countries with independent 
judiciaries. In states whose judicial branch is not truly independent, domestic courts rarely 
provide remedies to private parties when government actors violate domestic legal norms,92 so 
they can hardly be expected to provide remedies when government actors violate international 
norms. Second, one can distinguish between cases where the government invokes an 
international norm to justify imposing a sanction on a private party (as in domestic application of 
international criminal law),93 and cases where a private actor seeks a remedy against the 
government for violation of an international norm. This Part focuses on cases in the latter 
category. Third, one can distinguish between cases where private litigants file suit in State A 
against domestic government actors from State A, and cases where litigants file suit in State A 
                                                          
91 See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, (1998) U. PA. L. REV. 687, 726-
791. 
92 See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, Venezuela, 
at 14-17 (discussing denial of fair trial rights). 
93 See, e.g., Canada v. Mugesera, [2005] 2 SCR 100, ILDC 180 (Supreme Court of Canada) 
(ordering deportation of Rwandan national accused of incitement to commit genocide). 
against foreign government actors from State B.94 This Part focuses on cases where litigants ask 
courts to hold domestic officials accountable for violations of international norms. Three distinct 
bodies of law account for most domestic litigation in this field: international human rights law, 
international refugee law, and international humanitarian law (IHL).95 The following analysis 
cites examples from all three areas. 
In states with independent judiciaries, domestic courts frequently provide remedies for 
private parties whose rights are violated by government actors. If the norm at issue is a domestic 
legal norm, courts perform their routine functions. But if the norm at issue is an international 
legal norm, courts apply harmonization techniques in some cases and avoidance techniques in 
others. When courts apply harmonization techniques, they effectively treat the contested issue as 
a legal issue. When they apply avoidance techniques, they treat the contested issue as a political 
issue. Hence, the key question is this: In cases where private actors seek remedies against 
domestic officials for alleged violations of international legal norms,96 how can we explain 
decisions by domestic courts to apply harmonization techniques in some cases and avoidance 
techniques in others? To address this question, we distinguish among three methods for applying 
international law: (1) “silent application,” where courts apply a domestic rule derived from 
international law without mentioning international sources; (2) “indirect application,” where 
courts apply international law as a guide to interpreting domestic statutory or constitutional 
                                                          
94 See, e.g., Fang v. Jiang, [2007] NZAR 420, ILDC 1226 (High Court of New Zealand) (claim 
filed in New Zealand against Chinese government officials based upon acts of torture allegedly 
committed in China). 
95 IHL can be divided broadly into three sets of rules: a) rules governing the means and methods 
of warfare; b) rules governing the treatment of detainees in armed conflict; and c) rules related to 
administration of occupied territory. Domestic courts tend to view cases involving means and methods of 
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96 This formulation encompasses cases where private actors raise international law defenses in 
actions initiated by the government, as well as cases where private plaintiffs bring civil suits against 
government actors. 
provisions; and (3) “direct application,” where courts apply international law directly as a rule of 
decision. Each of these methods involves domestic courts in two prominent stages of 
governance: the interpretation and implementation of international law. 
SILENT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
When judges apply domestic legal rules, they often do so without acknowledging that 
those “domestic” rules are derived from international norms. Several countries adopted new 
Constitutions in the decades after World War II. Many of those new Constitutions include Bill of 
Rights provisions that were heavily influenced by international human rights instruments.97 
Domestic courts often apply those Bill of Rights provisions without mentioning international 
law. For example, the drafters of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has 
constitutional status in Canada, “looked to Canada’s international treaty obligations, especially 
the ICCPR, for inspiration and guidance.”98 Even so, the Supreme Court of Canada rarely looks 
to international law for guidance in interpreting the Charter.99 When courts apply domestic 
constitutional provisions modeled on international human rights provisions, the effect may be to 
harmonize international and domestic norms, because the constitutional drafters internalized the 
international norm into domestic constitutional law.  
A similar process occurs when national legislatures incorporate international norms into 
domestic statutes. For example, the United States enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 to implement 
                                                          
97 See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & Beth Simmons, Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, 
Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L. J. 61, 63 (2013) (showing 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
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98 Gib van Ert, USING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CANADIAN COURTS 333 (2d ed. 2008). 
99 See id. at 332-37. 
its obligations under the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.100 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has occasionally referenced international sources expressly in an effort to harmonize its 
interpretation of the statute with the nation’s international legal obligations.101 In most cases, 
though, U.S. courts apply the statute without reference to the Protocol or other international legal 
authorities.102 The courts’ narrow focus on the statute may sometimes create discrepancies 
between international and domestic rules. However, in many cases, straightforward application 
of the domestic statute on its own terms promotes harmony with the international norm because 
Congress incorporated the international norm into the statute.103 It is impossible to measure the 
harmonizing effects of different methods for domestic application of international law, but 
incorporation of international law into domestic constitutional and statutory provisions is 
undoubtedly one of the more effective techniques for entrenching international law in the realm 
of “law,” rather than “politics.” 
INDIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International Law in Statutory Interpretation 
Indirect application of international law as a guide to statutory interpretation is probably 
the most widely used overt judicial technique for harmonizing domestic law with international 
                                                          
100 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). Over one hundred legislative 
provisions in the U.S. define legal norms with reference to “the law of nations” or “international law.” See 
Michael P. Van Alstine, Stare Decisis and Foreign Affairs, (2012) 61 DUKE L.J. 941, 977-978. 
101 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437-40 (1987). 
102 See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that the practice of 
female genital mutilation can be the basis for a grant of asylum under the federal statute). The main 
opinion in Kasinga did not mention the Protocol, but Board Member Rosenberg’s concurring opinion did 
reference the Protocol. 
103 The domestic definition of refugee, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), is substantially 
identical to the international definition. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150, art. 1 (defining the term “refugee”) and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, art. 1 (modifying that definition). 
norms.104 Domestic courts in numerous states apply an interpretive presumption that domestic 
statutes should be construed in a manner consistent with international norms, including both 
treaties and customary international law. This interpretive presumption is sometimes called a 
“presumption of conformity” or a “presumption of compatibility.”105 In the United States, it is 
referred to as the Charming Betsy canon.106 Courts in hybrid monist states—including 
Germany,107 the Netherlands,108 Poland,109 South Africa,110 and the United States111—apply the 
presumption frequently in cases involving vertical rules to help ensure that government conduct 
conforms to the nation’s international legal obligations. Similarly, domestic courts in strict 
dualist states—including Australia,112 Canada,113 India,114 Israel,115 and the United 
Kingdom116—apply the presumption in a very similar manner. There do not appear to be any 
significant differences between hybrid monist states, as a group, and dualist states, as a group, in 
terms of the manner in which they apply the presumption of conformity. Notably, courts in 
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116 See Anthony Aust, United Kingdom 476, 482-83, in Treaty Enforcement, supra note 20. 
dualist states frequently apply the presumption to unincorporated treaties in roughly the same 
way that they apply it to incorporated treaties.117 
One recurring issue concerns the threshold conditions necessary to trigger application of 
the presumption. There is broad agreement that courts may apply the presumption in cases where 
the statute is facially ambiguous. The Supreme Court of Canada has gone further, holding that “it 
is reasonable to make reference to an international agreement at the very outset of the inquiry to 
determine if there is any ambiguity, even latent, in the domestic legislation.”118 Former Justice 
Kirby advocated a similar approach in Australia, arguing that courts should refer to international 
law “not only when there exists statutory ambiguity, but also where the construction of a statute 
would result in an interpretation contrary to international human rights standards.”119 However, 
the majority of the Australian High Court has rejected this approach, refusing “to endorse a 
wider role for [international law] in statutory interpretation other than where the legislature has 
clearly envisaged such a role or where there exists a clear ambiguity on the face of the statute.”120 
Although the presumption of conformity is a well-established principle of statutory 
interpretation in most countries with independent judiciaries, application of the principle is 
inconsistent. In most countries, careful scrutiny of judicial decisions would probably reveal 
numerous cases where the presumption was potentially applicable, but courts did not apply it.121 
In part, judicial failure to apply the presumption in cases where it is potentially relevant may be 
indicative of litigators’ failure to raise the issue. In part, though, inconsistent application of the 
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presumption also manifests a tendency to apply the presumption in cases where harmonization of 
domestic with international law yields results that the judge considers normatively appealing, 
and to avoid applying it in cases where harmonization with international law would yield 
unattractive results. For vertical rules that regulate government conduct, one might describe the 
latter situation as a “silent” avoidance technique—the result is that courts refuse to apply the 
international rule in deference to the government’s interests. 
In addition to applying a presumption of conformity as a guide to statutory interpretation, 
courts have also applied international law in cases involving judicial review of administrative 
action. For example, Israel’s Supreme Court routinely applies Geneva Convention IV (GC IV) to 
review the legality of actions by military authorities in the Occupied Territories.122 The court has 
justified judicial application of GC IV—even though it has no formal status as law in Israel—by 
invoking the government’s declared commitment to “respect the humanitarian provisions of the 
Convention.” The Australian High Court’s reasoning in Minister of State for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh123 is similar to the Israeli Supreme Court’s approach to GC IV. In Teoh, 
the government ordered deportation of a Malaysian national who had six young children in 
Australia. Teoh argued that the deportation order violated the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, an unincorporated treaty that has no formal status as law in Australia. The High Court 
said: 
[R]atification of a convention is a positive statement by the executive government 
of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the executive 
government and its agencies will act in accordance with the Convention. The 
positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate expectation, absent 
statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that administrative decision-
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makers will act in conformity with the Convention and treat the best interests of 
the children as a primary consideration.124 
The High Court ruled in favor of Teoh because he had a legitimate expectation that the 
government would act in accordance with treaty requirements, and the government failed to meet 
that expectation.125 Courts in other dualist states have generally declined to adopt the “legitimate 
expectations” doctrine,126 although Canadian courts have achieved similar results by applying the 
presumption of conformity.127 
Human Rights and Constitutional Interpretation 
Courts in both hybrid monist and dualist states apply international law—especially 
international human rights law—as an aid to interpreting national constitutions. Countries in 
Europe and Latin America that are subject to supranational judicial review, respectively, by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, use 
international law to harmonize domestic constitutional law with the jurisprudence of 
international human rights tribunals. For example, Peru’s Constitutional Court has said that 
Peruvian courts must interpret constitutional provisions pertaining to rights and liberties in a 
manner that is consistent with decisions of the Inter-American Court.128 Indeed, Inter-American 
Court decisions holding that national amnesty laws contravene human rights treaty obligations 
have had significant impact on constitutional developments in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and 
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Peru.129 Germany’s Constitutional Court has said that the German constitutional order is open 
towards international law, and that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in light of 
international law to avoid conflicts with Germany’s international obligations.130 Poland’s 
Constitutional Court invokes the European Convention on Human Rights and decisions of the 
European Court “as additional arguments in establishing the scope and meaning of relevant 
constitutional provisions.”131 
International human rights law has also exerted significant influence on constitutional 
jurisprudence in some states that are not subject to the jurisdiction of regional human rights 
tribunals.132 South Africa and India are leading examples.133 The South African Constitution 
states: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal, or forum . . . must consider 
international law; and may consider foreign law.”134 Given this constitutional mandate, the 
jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court is broadly consistent with the principle 
“that the spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights . . . are inextricably linked to international 
law and the values and approaches of the international community.”135 Similarly, India’s 
Constitution states: “The State shall endeavor to . . . foster respect for international law and 
treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another.”136 Accordingly, 
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decisions by India’s Supreme Court manifest a view “that any international convention not 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution and in harmony with its 
spirit must be read into those provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof.”137 
In contrast, the use of international law in constitutional interpretation has been 
controversial in Australia and the United States. In Australia, former Justice Kirby was a strong 
advocate for judicial application of international law in constitutional interpretation, but he never 
persuaded a majority of the High Court to adopt his preferred approach.138 The United States 
Supreme Court has occasionally cited international human rights law to support its interpretation 
of a contested constitutional provision. In every such case, though, the majority’s reliance on 
international law provoked a sharp dissent.139 The contrast between India and South Africa, on 
one hand, and the United States and Australia, on the other, suggests that countries with newer 
constitutions tend to embrace the use of international human rights law in constitutional 
interpretation. However, countries with older constitutional traditions are more hesitant to apply 
international law in constitutional interpretation, unless they are subject to the jurisdiction of an 
international human rights tribunal. 
DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Direct Application of Treaties 
In strict dualist states, direct application of treaties is not possible because treaties are not 
part of the domestic legal order unless the legislature enacts a statute to incorporate the treaty. 
Once a treaty has been incorporated, courts apply the statute, not the treaty, at least as a formal 
                                                          
137 Jayawickrama, supra note 114, at 246. 
138 See Rothwell, supra note 112, at 156-58. 
139 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
matter. Courts in dualist states apply other techniques to harmonize domestic law with 
international law, but direct application of treaties is not an available option.140  
In hybrid monist states, some or all treaties have domestic legal force, even without 
implementing legislation. However, the fact that a treaty has domestic legal force does not 
necessarily mean that it is directly applicable by courts.141 In most hybrid monist states, treaties 
are directly applicable if they are intended to benefit private parties, provided that the particular 
treaty provision at issue is sufficiently clear and precise that courts are competent to apply it as a 
rule of decision. For example, in a case where arresting officers did not inform arrestees of their 
right to consular assistance under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
the German Constitutional Court reversed the criminal convictions, holding that Article 36 is 
directly applicable under Article 59(2) of the German Basic Law.142 Similarly, where a Dutch 
political party invoked freedom of association principles to justify its policy denying women the 
right to stand for election, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that Article 7 of the Convention 
on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women required the government to ensure that all 
political parties allow women to run for elective offices.143 And in Eichenlaub v. Axa France, a 
French appellate court held that Article 6.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, which protects the right to work, was directly applicable and superseded 
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Article 75 of the local commerce code.144 Similarly, domestic courts in Latin America have often 
held that treaties involving human rights or humanitarian law are directly applicable.145 
Courts in the United States, by contrast, generally do not apply human rights treaties 
directly because the federal political branches have consistently inserted declarations in the 
instruments of ratification for human rights treaties specifying that the treaties are not self-
executing.146 The correct interpretation of such “NSE declarations” is contested.147 Regardless, 
no U.S. court has specifically held that a human rights treaty is self-executing, and the courts 
have typically refrained from applying the treaties directly as rules of decision.148 Some U.S. 
courts have held that portions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are self-executing,149 but judicial 
authority is divided on this question.150 
A judicial decision that a treaty is not directly applicable (or not self-executing) is a 
common avoidance technique that courts utilize to justify application of domestic law without 
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reference to international law. In contrast, direct application of treaties by domestic courts is an 
important technique for harmonizing domestic law with international law. It bears emphasis, 
though, that direct application does not guarantee harmonization because domestic courts 
sometimes interpret directly applicable treaties in a way that is not entirely consistent with the 
dominant international interpretation. 
Direct Application of Customary International Law 
Domestic courts in numerous countries apply customary international law directly as a 
rule of decision in cases where foreign states and/or foreign government officials raise a 
sovereign immunity defense.151 In the United States, lower federal courts have applied 
customary international law directly as a rule of decision in numerous cases under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS) where foreign plaintiffs alleged human rights violations by foreign government 
officials.152 However, U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 2004 and 2013 imposed significant 
constraints on plaintiffs who seek to raise similar claims in the future.153  
Domestic courts rarely apply customary international law directly as a rule of decision to 
resolve claims by private plaintiffs against domestic government actors. The most notable line of 
cases is a set of decisions by the Israeli Supreme Court involving the Occupied Territories.154 In 
Israel, courts have the authority to apply customary international law directly as a rule of 
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decision where there is no controlling statute.155 For almost fifty years, Israeli military 
authorities have governed the Occupied Territories by promulgating military orders. Israel’s 
Supreme Court was initially reluctant to review the legality of such orders, but the Court held in 
the Beth El case156 that the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Regarding the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land is part of customary international law, and is therefore directly applicable by the 
judiciary in cases involving the Occupied Territories. Since that time, Israel’s Supreme Court has 
applied customary IHL directly to decide dozens, if not hundreds, of cases arising from the 
ongoing military occupation.157 
SUMMARY 
The preceding analysis of domestic courts’ engagement with vertical international rules 
supports two main conclusions. First, domestic courts in states subject to the jurisdiction of a 
regional human rights tribunal that has authority to issue legally binding judgments are more 
likely to apply harmonization techniques, and less likely to apply avoidance techniques, than 
their counterparts in states that are not subject to the jurisdiction of any such tribunal. 
Interestingly, the fact that states are subject to supranational jurisdiction under a regional treaty 
may make their courts less inclined to engage in avoidance behavior with respect to global 
treaties, including global treaties that do not provide for supranational judicial review. Second, 
domestic courts in states whose national constitutions were promulgated or substantially 
amended after adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) are more 
likely to apply harmonization techniques, and less likely to apply avoidance techniques, than 
their counterparts in states with older national constitutions. For human rights norms, in 
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particular, the tendency to prefer harmonization over avoidance is especially true for states 
whose post-1948 constitutions incorporate human rights norms embodied in the UDHR and/or 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter One in this volume suggests that the relationship between politics and 
international law varies across stages of governance and governance systems. It notes that 
“different systems of governance are demarcated by their subject matter, their scope, or both.” 
This chapter has shown that the role of domestic courts in applying international law depends 
heavily on the subject matter of the international legal rule at issue—in particular, whether the 
rule is horizontal, transnational, or vertical. 
Domestic courts typically view horizontal rules as “political,” not “legal.” Accordingly, 
domestic courts rarely apply horizontal rules. Rules governing the jurisdictional immunities of 
states are the most notable exception. Domestic courts routinely apply immunity rules because 
they are seen as legal, despite the fact that they regulate horizontal relationships between states. 
Patterns of judicial enforcement and non-enforcement of horizontal rules do not differ 
substantially between dualist states and hybrid monist states. 
In contrast, domestic courts typically view transnational rules as legal, not political. 
Accordingly, courts in both dualist states and hybrid monist states routinely apply transnational 
rules to help resolve cross-border disputes between private parties. Although many transnational 
rules were part of customary international law in the nineteenth century, most of the key rules 
have since been codified in treaties. The political branches play an important role in 
incorporating transnational treaties into the domestic legal order—either by means of legislative 
incorporation, or by means of legislative approval for treaty ratification (in hybrid monist states). 
However, once the treaty is incorporated, the political branches are largely disengaged, and 
domestic courts have primary responsibility for treaty implementation. 
Application of vertical rules by domestic courts straddles the boundary between legal and 
political. If courts view a particular issue as political, they are likely to employ one of several 
avoidance techniques, leaving the issue to be resolved by politics. However, if courts view an 
issue as legal, they are likely to employ one of several harmonization techniques in an effort to 
harmonize domestic law with the relevant international legal rule. Several factors influence the 
decision between harmonization and avoidance in any particular case. Here, the distinction 
between dualist and hybrid monist states has little influence over the choice between 
harmonization and avoidance, but it does influence the particular type of harmonization or 
avoidance technique that courts utilize.  
